Beyond the Boogeyman: The Origins and History of Hamas
Despite decades of demonization, Hamas emerged from a broader, older resistance—one rooted in Palestine’s long struggle against colonialism and occupation.
Since long before the events of October 7, 2023, media coverage of Hamas in the West has consistently started and ended with the group and its actions, as if they exist for no reason other than to pop up occasionally and commit violence.
Contrary to popular belief, however, they exist as a result of a long-standing struggle that extends further back than October 7, to say the least.
Its origins precede Hamas’ foundation in 1987, and even predate the establishment of the ethno-religious state of Israel, itself, in 1948.
In fact, for the better part of a century, multiple generations have spent their entire lives resisting erasure—clinging to threadbare memories, grasping at the remnants of a home lost to colonial conquest.
For the young, it’s a place they’ve never seen; for the old, one they will never forget—and it’s all still visible, just across the horizon from the slums to which they’ve been exiled.
As Israeli historian Ilan Pappé notes: "The ethnic cleansing of 1948 forms the essential background for understanding all forms of Palestinian resistance that followed. Every Palestinian faction, regardless of ideology, has been shaped by this foundational catastrophe."
It’s through this lens—a lens too often obscured by Western propaganda—that one thing becomes clear:
Hamas’ origins, ideology and role in the larger struggle are intrinsically tied to those of its predecessors and contemporaries—all of them groups of refugees, victims of apartheid with nothing left to lose. Each one is resolved to fight for the liberation of their people, even if doing so means their own martyrdom.
Collectively, these forces share a singular goal: the right to return and to self-determination for the Palestinian people. Theirs is a fight that has existed only as long as the illegal occupation of their homeland, which, to reiterate, was long before the birth of Hamas.
A Colonial Blueprint for Genocide
The aggression against Palestine began in the waning years of the Ottoman Empire.
In 1897, Theodor Herzl held the First Zionist Conference, in Basel, Switzerland, where he outlined his framework for an ethno-religious nation state.
Herzl’s vision, laid out in Der Judenstaat (1896), wasn’t just about establishing a homeland for Jews, it was about ensuring that this homeland would be a “Westernized” society, a vanguard of European interests in the region.
Born into a well-to-do, middle-class family in Budapest, Herzl moved to Vienna in 1878, where he immersed himself deeply in the city's culture and politics. As such, Herzl envisioned a state that would mirror the cultural refinement and political structures of the European powers to which he was accustomed.
Incidentally, the Middle East region had become increasingly valuable due to its strategic location and natural resources—particularly oil, which the industrialized West had since begun pilfering.
Herzl himself acknowledged that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would be beneficial not only to Jewish settlers but also to Western imperialism, proposing it as a buffer against Eastern, or “Oriental,” influences.
Despite a number of European countries during that time actively trying to purge Jews from their lands, Herzl predicted, with stunning accuracy, that “the anti-Semites will become our most dependable friends, the anti-Semitic countries our allies.”
Western powers were acutely aware of the geopolitical implications a post-Ottoman “Westernized” colony in the Middle East presented, and as such, they gave the Zionist project their blessings.
Between Britain's Rothschilds-backed Balfour Declaration and the US’ subsequent Lodge-Fish Resolution, a desire for colonization of the region had been made crystal clear.
These dynamics fundamentally shaped the trajectory of Zionism, intertwining it with settler-colonialism, Western expansionism, and the systematic displacement of Palestine’s indigenous population.
Meanwhile, whereas existing Jewish communities in Palestine had long been integral to the local social fabric, Herzl’s political Zionism sought not cohabitation, but replacement, advocating for mass immigration, economic control, and ultimately, the removal of Palestinian inhabitants.
In 1917, Britain, the White European entity who held the mandate of authority over the Arabic region indicated its interest in Herzl’s Zionist plot, and Balfour served as its green-lighting of the groundwork for the mass removal of Palestinians and their systemic disenfranchisement.
This development, a quite significant one, came after earlier attempts to offer Zionist leaders territory outside of Palestine—including the infamous 1903 British Uganda Scheme, in which colonial officials proposed parts of East Africa for a potential Jewish homeland.
Though Herzl initially entertained the offer, the Zionist movement ultimately rejected it, remaining focused on Palestine—where, in their view, the Jewish state could serve Western imperial interests in the heart of the Arab world.
In 1937, David Ben-Gurion, who would soon become Israel’s first Prime Minister, indicated that Herzl’s scheme was well under way when he wrote, in a letter to his son:
“We must expel the Arabs and take their places,” adding, “if we have to use force—not to dispossess the Arabs of the Negev and Transjordan, but to guarantee our own right to settle in those places—then we have force at our disposal.”
Ben-Gurion would later make his understanding of the Palestinian struggle even more clear, saying,
“If I were an Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have taken their country. Sure, God promised it to us, but what does that matter to them?”
Nevertheless, the effort to usurp Palestinian land lurched forward in momentum.
The Implementation of Zionist Conquest
Framed as a sanctuary for those fleeing the Holocaust (some of whom had been denied entry in America), White European Zionists began imigrating from their homelands en masse to Palestine— some through collaboration with the Nazis, others through illegal immigration schemes seeking to substantially increase the hopeful nationalist state’s numbers.
Later, they would resume their clandestine immigration operations, this time in an effort to further fortify their ranks by coercing Arab Jews into emigrating.
These missions were to bring about, as Dr. Rashid Khalidi puts it, the "demographic critical mass and military manpower that were necessary for the ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948."
The ensuing Nakba saw over 700,000 Palestinians forcibly expelled, with more than 500 villages erased from existence completely.
Zionist paramilitary factions—comprised of violent, militarized street gangs including the Haganah, Irgun, and the Lehi Stern Gang—led a campaign of terror, carrying out massacres in Palestinian villages. Of the virtually countless massacres, some stood out in particular for their depravity:
Deir Yassin (April, 9, 1948): Over 100 Palestinians, including women and children, slaughtered by Irgun and Lehi forces. (Watch: Born in Deir Yassin)
Tantura Massacre (May 22-23, 1948): Israeli forces executed Palestinian civilians en masse, burying them in unmarked graves. (Watch: Tantura (2022).
Safsaf Massacre (Oct 29, 1948): Haganah forces raped and executed villagers before seizing their land. (This massacre was only one of two massacres that occurred on this day)
Kafr Qasim Massacre (Oct 29, 1956): Israeli border police murdered 49 Palestinian civilians, including women and children, as they returned home from work and play—unaware of a newly imposed curfew.
This massacre was carried out under direct military orders and later justified by officials as a wartime necessity (this occurred on the same day as the Tripartite Aggression by Israel, which began the Suez Crisis).
Emergence of Resistance
As Noam Chomsky outlines in "The Fateful Triangle," the events of 1948 period laid crucial foundations for understanding contemporary Palestinian resistance.
The aftermath of the Nakba left the Palestinian people stateless and dispersed across refugee camps, including those in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.
Unsurprisingly, this forced displacement led to the inevitable emergence of various resistance factions, each developing distinct ideological frameworks and strategies to combat Zionist settler-colonialism, all connected by the collective vision of a liberated Palestine.
Among the first to form were small-scale guerrilla groups, known as Fedayeen (which translates to "one who risks his life voluntarily"), who were deeply influenced by the anti-colonial struggles taking place across the Global South.
These groups operated with limited resources but maintained an active role in cross-border skirmishes from Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—from which they could respond to attacks by the occupation.
Art of the resistance: Fedayeen political poster
One such attack—and one of the most harrowing examples of the violence experienced by these border communities—was the Qibya massacre of 1953.
Under the command of Ariel Sharon and the elite Israeli Unit 101, Israeli forces raided the village of Qibya in the West Bank, then part of Jordan’s jurisdiction. They destroyed more than 40 homes, a school, and a mosque—killing at least 69 civilians, many of them women and children, throwing grenades into homes, then trapping residents inside, before leaving them buried beneath the rubble.
This detestable act of Israeli brutality, codenamed Operation Shoshana, was officially justified as revenge for the killing of a settler woman and her two children.
This, despite the fact that Jordan, bound by its commitments under the General Armistice Agreement and Security Council resolutions, had already assured that the perpetrators—who appeared to be lone actors—would be apprehended and brought to justice.
The barbaric annihilation of Qibya was condemned by the international community.
For Palestinian refugees, however, it confirmed what they already knew: that the occupation would not be satisfied with the land already taken, and that even exile did not mean safety.
By the late 1950s and early 1960s, formalized Palestinian nationalist movements began to arise, many of which were founded in response to the failures of Arab states to prevent or reverse Israeli expansion.
These factions, while diverse in ideology and strategy, aligned under the common cause of Palestinian liberation.
The most significant faction to emerge was Fatah, established in the late 1950s by Yasser Arafat, Abu Jihad (born Khalil al-Wazir), and Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf).
Fatah emerged in the late 1950s as a fiercely independent Palestinian nationalist movement, its name drawn from a reverse acronym of the Arabic for Palestinian National Liberation Movement.
Founded by figures like Yasser Arafat, Abu Jihad, and Abu Iyad, the group rejected the failed promises of pan-Arab regimes and instead championed armed struggle as the most viable route to liberation—particularly after the disillusionment of the 1948 Nakba and the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Abu Jihad , Fatah’s Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Palestinian forces, underscored this autonomous spirit in a 1984 interview.
He rejected the notion that displacement spelled defeat. Instead, he saw it as an opportunity to rebuild, saying: “Our presence here has not meant the end of our movement. It has meant organizing, planning, and continuing the struggle by all means available.”
Abu Jihad emphasized the importance of resisting co-optation by regional powers, insisting that the Palestinian movement could not rely on the agendas of Arab regimes that had repeatedly failed to protect Palestinian rights.
Eventually, the group would actively court Egyptian and Syrian support to gain leverage—a strategic, necessary tactic echoing those used by anti-colonial guerrilla movements across the Global South, namely Africa and Asia, where aligning with Cold War powers often proved essential for survival.
At the same time, a number of Palestinian leftist and Marxist factions began to coalesce, drawing inspiration from revolutionary ideologies and liberation struggles across Latin America, in the fight against imperialism.
Among these were:
The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) – Founded in 1967 by George Habash, the PFLP took a Marxist-Leninist approach to resistance, emphasizing class struggle and opposing negotiations with Israel. It became known for high-profile operations, including airline hijackings and urban guerrilla warfare.
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine* (DFLP) – A 1969 offshoot of the PFLP, led by Nayef Hawatmeh, the DFLP emphasized mass mobilization, worker solidarity, and popular resistance alongside armed struggle.
The Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) – Originally formed in the 1960s, the PLF became an active participant in resistance operations, particularly in the 1980s.
As-Sa’iqa – A Syrian-backed faction, whose name means “Thunderbolt,” formed to ensure Damascus retained influence over Palestinian politics.
* The DFLP distinguished itself from other factions through its early and deliberate integration of feminist praxis. It promoted women's participation not only in political mobilization but also in military operations—training female fighters and establishing organizations such as the Union of Women’s Action Committees (UWAC) and the Palestinian Federation of Women’s Action Committees (PFWAC). These wings advanced women’s roles in education, healthcare, and armed resistance, reinforcing the DFLP’s vision of national liberation as inherently tied to social and gender equality.
DFLP Woman’s Militia
The Formation of the PLO: A New Era of Consolidated Resistance
By the early 1960s, it became evident that a centralized leadership structure was needed to unify these various factions and provide a cohesive strategy for Palestinian resistance. In 1964, under the auspices of the Arab League, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established.
“The PLO represented the first cohesive political expression of Palestinian nationalism on the world stage," says the aforementioned Dr. Khalidi, who is Edward Said Professor Emeritus of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University. "They transformed the Palestinian struggle from a refugee problem to a national liberation movement.
Envisioned as an umbrella organization that would bring together Fatah and the various fedayeen factions under a single entity, the PLO made it possible for Palestinians to present a unified front in their struggle for liberation.
While initially seen by external Arab regimes as a hopeful political tool, the PLO rapidly evolved into an independent force by the late 1960s, largely due to Fatah’s growing dominance within its ranks.
By the 1970s, the PLO had secured international legitimacy, including recognition by numerous global institutions including the United Nations, who granted Palestine non-member status.
However, its commitment to armed resistance versus diplomatic engagement would remain a source of division within Palestinian politics, leading to tensions with more radical factions like the PFLP and, later, with Islamist movements such as Hamas.
Transition to Palestinian Authority: Betrayal and the Road to Hamas
In 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. That same year, Arafat addressed the United Nations General Assembly, a pivotal moment that highlighted the PLO’s focus on diplomatic efforts.
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the PLO operated from bases in Lebanon and Tunisia, conducting diplomatic outreach while also supporting armed resistance against Israeli military targets.
Despite continued Israeli and U.S. hostility, the PLO eventually began signaling a willingness to negotiate, seeing enough value in such a pursuit to engage diplomatically.
However, such perceived value was negated by repeated betrayals—none more devastating than the events of 1982 in Lebanon, which revealed the true nature of U.S. and Israeli duplicity.
Having being expelled from Jordan during Black September (1970), the PLO had relocated to Lebanon, where it established political and military operations in Beirut and southern refugee camps.
This presence quickly became a target for Israeli aggression, culminating in the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon—a military campaign known by the audaciously named “Operation Peace for Galilee” justified under the pretext of eliminating the PLO, but executed with all the gusto of a genocidal attempt to erase all Palestinian life.
In the face of overwhelming Israeli firepower, Arafat and the PLO were forced, once again, to negotiate —this time, concerning their own departure from Beirut, in exchange for an end to the bombardment.
The United States, acting as a mediator, promised Arafat that Palestinian civilians—including thousands of refugees displaced from the Nakba—would be safe if the PLO agreed to leave Lebanon.
Trusting these assurances, Arafat and thousands of PLO fighters relocated to Tunisia, effectively stripping Palestinian refugees in Lebanon of their only means of defense.
What followed was one of the most horrific massacres in modern history.
Between September 16 and 18, 1982, the Israeli military, under the command of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, encircled the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut and allowed their Christian Phalangist allies—known for their deep-seated animosity toward Palestinians—to enter and carry out an indiscriminate slaughter.
Armed with Israeli-supplied weapons and operating under Israeli-provided floodlights, these militias tortured, raped, and butchered thousands of Palestinian refugees. Many of the victims had been driven from their homes during the Nakba in 1948, only to be hunted down decades later, as refugees in Lebanon.
The massacre at Sabra and Shatila was an act of betrayal of the highest order. The very same U.S. government that had guaranteed the safety of Palestinian refugees stood by as Israeli-backed militias carried out their bloodbath.
This atrocity underscored the illusion of Western-brokered peace agreements—a lesson that would reshape Palestinian resistance in the years to come.
A Catalyst for Emergence: The Formation of Hezbollah
The Israeli invasion and the atrocities at Sabra and Shatila served as catalysts for the mobilization of Lebanon's Shia community.
This mobilization led to the formation of Hezbollah in 1985, a Shia militant group supported by Iran, which has since become a major player in Lebanese politics and a persistent adversary of Israel.
The Peace Illusion: Oslo Becomes a Tool of Occupation
Under Yasser Arafat, the PLO’s pivot toward diplomacy had apparently paid off—the movement received international recognition, even if it had come with a compromise.
In 1988, Arafat acknowledged Israel’s right to exist and called for a two-state solution, a controversial move that divided Palestinian resistance.
This shift led to the Oslo Accords (1993) and the creation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, meant to serve as an interim government in the West Bank and Gaza.
Yet, Oslo was never meant to empower Palestinians, a reality visible in its ultimate failure in establishing a Palestinian state. The PA became an administrative extension of Israeli control, financially dependent on Western donors who ensured that those aligned with their interests—not the Palestinian people’s interests—remained in power.
In a leaked 2001 video, Netanyahu—unaware he was being recorded—boasted about how he had sabotaged the Oslo Accords during his first term as prime minister (1996–1999).
Speaking to a group of settlers, he described how he manipulated the agreement’s wording to ensure that Israel would never be forced to return to the 1967 borders, explaining that he defined military zones broadly to include vast areas of Palestinian land, effectively nullifying any real pathway to statehood.
With a smirk, Netanyahu reinforced his control over the process, saying:
“I de facto put an end to the Oslo Accords” going on to acknowledge Israel’s ability to manipulate U.S. policy, bragging “I know what America is; America is a thing you can move very easily, move it in the right direction.”
This candid admission lays bare the deception at the heart of the so-called peace process, exposing Israel’s long-standing efforts to weaponize diplomacy as a tool of occupation rather than a means of resolving the conflict.
To be sure, this pattern of deceit did not begin with Netanyahu. Going back to at least 1967, figures like Moshe Dayan, Allon, and Eshkol had engaged in a strategy of deliberate ambiguity in diplomatic dealings with Jordan and the Palestinians.
Time after time, Israel dismissed genuine peace overtures from both Jordan and Palestine to maintain the illusion of Israeli openness and Palestinian intransigence.
What was sold to the public as a diplomatic failure was actually sabotage; a willingness to negotiate, but, regrettably, with “no partner for peace.”
Evolution of Palestinian Leadership
As laid out in the Oslo framework, the PLO transitioned into the Palestinian Authority—an arrangement that consolidated power under Yasser Arafat and entrenched a centralized leadership structure.
Increasingly disillusioned by Arafat’s diplomatic overtures and the West’s hollow promises, Palestinians began to seek an alternative.
They realized that Oslo had not delivered a path to independence, but instead created a complex bureaucracy that managed to turn occupation into apartheid. Understandably, most Palestinians were not happy with this development, a sentiment that continues today.
The lack of trust in leadership served as the perfect catalyst for the rise of Hamas, who, incidentally, had been opposed to the Oslo framework from the outset.
The group rejected the idea of negotiating with an occupier that was still building settlements and expelling Palestinians.
It’s worth noting, however, that despite its historical aversion to diplomatic efforts, Hamas has, at times, signaled a willingness to negotiate, under specific conditions.
In June 2007, former Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh expressed openness to a long-term truce with Israel—contingent on Israel returning to its pre-1967 borders and allowing the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.
(In ‘67, villagers were removed from their lands by Israel, and faced further violence for even going back to retrieve supplies).
The few times when there have been truce agreements in place, any semblance of peace is short lived, with Israel consistently reneging on its part of the deal, or sabotaging proceedings before a deal can be reached.
While Hamas' stance remains fundamentally rooted in resistance, these occasional overtures toward diplomacy underscore the complexities of the Palestinian struggle.
Negotiations, when they are entertained, are often driven more by pragmatism than ideological compromise; something not out of the ordinary in modern politics.
Nevertheless, Israel, as well as the US, have largely dismissed these overtures, continuing to enforce blockades and economic strangulation in Gaza rather than engaging with the conditions set forth for any potential truce.
Meanwhile, as for Palestinian Authority; it’s presently dominated by Fatah and led by Mahmoud Abbas.
Abbas, now in the 21st year of what was supposed to be a four-year term, presides over a PA widely viewed by Palestinians as corrupt, ineffective and overly compliant with Israeli demands.
In March 2025, he announced a willingness to hold presidential and parliamentary elections within a year, contingent upon favorable conditions. Of course, given the repeated postponements of past election promises, many Palestinians remain skeptical about the likelihood of these elections taking place.
It’s exactly this failure of leadership and the disillusionment that accompanied it that has created the ample space in which Hamas has positioned itself as the comparatively “legitimate” voice of Palestinian resistance—not only as a military alternative, but as a moral and ideological one.
While previous factions had been rooted in secular Arab nationalism or Marxist thought, Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood, grounding its vision of liberation in Islamic jurisprudence and resistance theology. This shift carried profound implications: it restructured governance, reframed the rhetoric of resistance, and, in some cases, limited the broader coalition-building that secular factions once facilitated—particularly with Christian Palestinians and the global left.
The First Intifada (1987) and the Birth of Hamas
The First Intifada
The First Intifada, or “uprising,” erupted in December 1987 as a spontaneous yet sustained grassroots uprising against Israeli occupation. Fueled by decades of systemic oppression, land seizures, and military crackdowns, the revolt reached critical mass when an Israeli military vehicle crashed into a civilian car in Gaza, killing four Palestinians.
This mass mobilization placed youth, women, and community leaders at the forefront. Unlike previous resistance efforts that had been largely dominated by armed factions, the First Intifada harnessed community energy, transforming daily acts of defiance—such as boycotting Israeli goods or refusing to pay taxes—into a sustained movement.
It was amid this growing resistance that Hamas gained popularity as a transformative force, offering an alternative to the increasingly ineffective and corrupt Palestinian Authority, and the PLO, whose diplomatic efforts had failed to secure Palestinian self-determination.
Founded in 1987, Hamas positioned itself not just as a military force but as a provider of essential social services, filling the void left by the PA’s shortcomings.
Much like the Black Panther Party (BPP) in the United States—whose survival programs provided free breakfasts, medical clinics, and educational initiatives in neglected Black communities—Hamas built a vast network of schools, hospitals, and welfare programs to support Palestinians suffering under Israeli occupation and economic deprivation.
Just as the BPP’s community outreach helped strengthen its grassroots support while challenging systemic neglect and state repression, Hamas’ investment in social infrastructure solidified its legitimacy among Palestinians, particularly in Gaza, where living conditions were deteriorating under Israeli control.
At the same time, Hamas' division of armed resistance materialized in a more structured form with the establishment of its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in the early 1990s.
The brigade was named after Izz ad- Din al-Qassam, a Syrian-born preacher who led armed resistance against British and Zionist forces in the 1930s. His martyrdom in 1935 made him an enduring symbol of Palestinian defiance.
Initially emerging from underground Islamist networks and local security initiatives—such as MAJD, which aimed to root out collaborators and instill internal discipline—the Brigades eventually consolidated into a hierarchical fighting force.
The group’s early tactics included ambushes, improvised attacks, suicide bombings. However, after its election to leadership, Hamas would adopt more sophisticated operations, evolving in response to Israel’s increasingly disproportionate military actions and ongoing occupation.
Over the following decades, Hamas continued to grow, navigating regional alliances, military conflicts, and internal political struggles while maintaining its dual role as both a governing entity and a resistance movement.
The mysterious circumstances surrounding Yasser Arafat's death in 2004 essentially confirmed Palestinian’s skepticism toward diplomatic solutions. Medical reports indicated elevated levels of polonium-210—a radioactive substance used in assassinations—in Arafat's personal effects.
After his death, Russia and France, an ally of Israel, conducted investigations, which, they claimed, concluded that Arafat died of natural causes.
However the Swiss, a largely neutral entity, reported that their investigation maintains that the poisoning theory is “more consistent” with their findings.
Arafat, who had evolved from a guerrilla fighter into a statesman, came to embody a hope that diplomacy might finally deliver Palestinian liberation.
However, his death signaled to many Palestinians that no amount of negotiation, moderation, or concessions would ever be enough for the Zionist project to accept an independent Palestinian state.
The failure of the peace process, combined with the humiliating terms of the Oslo Accords and the erosion of Arafat’s authority by both Israel and the U.S., left a bitter legacy.
For the emerging generation of Palestinians, this breakdown of diplomacy reinforced their perception that liberation would not be won at the negotiating table, but through resistance.
As a result, Hamas’ popularity surged, particularly in Gaza. With its emphasis on armed struggle and its investment in social infrastructure, the group presented itself as a disciplined alternative to the failed promises of the Palestinian Authority.
Though the First Intifada largely emphasized nonviolent resistance, it was met with brutal force—mass arrests, home demolitions, curfews, and lethal crackdowns.
By the time of the Second Intifada in 2000—incited by Ariel Sharon’s provocative incursion into Al-Aqsa Mosque and the collapse of the Oslo peace process—the resistance had shifted. What began with stones and slogans had hardened into armed confrontation—born of exhaustion and desperation, but framed as extremism.
By then, more than half a century had passed since the Nakba began this long, unbroken exile.
The Second Intifada
The Calm That Never Was
Despite media narratives framing the October 7 Hamas attack as unprovoked, the reality on the ground tells a different story. Throughout 2023, the West Bank endured an unprecedented surge in Israeli settler violence, with attacks on Palestinian communities reaching record highs.
By the time of the October 7 assault, more than 1,200 settler attacks had been documented, including physical assaults, arson, property destruction, and the forced displacement of Palestinian families.
Meanwhile, Gaza faced its own escalation. In May 2023, Israeli airstrikes targeted residential areas, killing 13 Palestinians—among them four children and four women. These assaults were part of a broader pattern of military operations that inflicted widespread civilian casualties and decimated critical infrastructure throughout the year.
Even in the days immediately leading up to October 7, violence persisted. On October 4, Israeli forces shot and killed two young Palestinian men near Tulkarm.
The next day, two more were killed during military operations in the area. On October 6—just one day before the Hamas-led offensive—a 19-year-old named Labib Dumaidi was shot dead by an Israeli settler in the West Bank town of Huwara during a raid.
For Palestinians, there has never been a cease in the violence.
Each uprising, each protest, and each armed response emerges not from a void, but from the roar of a decades-long onslaught—a history of killings, evictions, arrests, and sieges that predates every counterattack by years, even decades.
Foundational Figures of Hamas
As previously mentioned, Hamas, like its predecessors, did not exist before there was before there was something to resist. That much is impossible for anyone to deny.
These factions were formed by men who were, themselves, products of exile, occupation, and generational trauma—shaped by a world where being Palestinian meant living without autonomy, without justice, and often, without a home.
The early figures of Hamas were not merely ideologues, they lived realities crafted by their oppressors, which presented something to resist both ideologically and physically.
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin
Born in 1936 in al-Jura, a village near Ashkelon, Yassin was forced into the Gaza Strip with his family following the Nakba. A spinal injury at age 12 left him paralyzed from the neck down, bound for life to a wheelchair. yet his condition didn’t stop him from becoming one of the most influential Islamic thinkers in Palestine.
A prominent figure in the Muslim Brotherhood, Yassin shifted from religious teaching and social services to resistance following the Israeli occupation of Gaza in 1967. He co-founded Hamas in 1987 as the First Intifada erupted, advocating for both Islamic reform and armed struggle.
In 2004, Yassin was assassinated by Israel in a targeted airstrike as he was leaving a mosque in Gaza City.
Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi
Al-Rantisi was born in Yibna in 1947 and displaced, like hundreds of thousands of others, during the ethnic cleansing of 1948. Raised in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, he went on to study medicine in Egypt, returning to Gaza to practice pediatrics.
Politicized by occupation and repression, he helped co-found Hamas alongside Yassin, becoming one of its most outspoken public figures. After Yassin's assassination, al-Rantisi was appointed leader of Hamas in Gaza—but his tenure lasted only 26 days before he, too, was killed in an Israeli airstrike.
Ismail Haniyeh
Born in 1962 in the al-Shati, or “Beach” refugee camp, Haniyeh’s family had fled al-Jura during the Nakba. He earned a degree in Arabic literature at the Islamic University of Gaza, where his political consciousness was shaped by both the student movement and the early stirrings of organized resistance.
Arrested multiple times and famously exiled to Lebanon in 1992, Haniyeh returned to become a senior political leader and longtime aide to Yassin. Haniyeh served as the head of Hamas’ government in Gaza from 2007 until 2017, helping to navigate the organization through elections, international isolation, and repeated military assaults.
On July 31, 2024, Haniyeh was assassinated in Tehran by an Israeli airstrike, alongside his personal bodyguard. He had been staying at a military-run guesthouse after attending the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
Born in 1962 in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, Yahya Sinwar was part of the generation born directly into the fallout of the Nakba—raised not in the land of his ancestors, but in overcrowded camps under military occupation. A childhood spent under blockade and repression instilled in him a worldview defined by struggle.
Sinwar helped establish Hamas’ internal security arm, MAJD, which focused on rooting out collaborators and enforcing internal discipline. In 1988, he was arrested by Israeli forces and sentenced to four life terms for his alleged role in the killing of suspected informants. He would spend 22 years in Israeli prison, much of it in solitary confinement.
During that time, he learned Hebrew fluently and was exposed to an array of ideological debate and resistance theory. Released in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, Sinwar reentered Gaza as a hardened, deeply respected figure within the movement.
Following Haniyeh’s tenure as the head of Hamas’ government, leadership transitioned to Sinwar, who remained in that role until his assassination by Israel in October 2024.
Subsequently, Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, assumed leadership. Born in 1975, in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, the younger Sinwar has been a member of Hamas since the mid-90s.
Mohammed Sinwar
The younger brother of Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Sinwar assumed leadership of Hamas in Gaza following Yahya's death in October 2024. Known for his clandestine operations, he earned the nickname "the Shadow." On May 13, 2025, Israeli airstrikes targeted a tunnel beneath the European Hospital in Khan Younis, where Mohammed and other senior Hamas officials were reportedly meeting.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later stated that Israel had "probably" killed Mohammed Sinwar in the strike. While Hamas has not officially confirmed his death, reports indicate that his body was recovered and buried in secrecy
Saleh al-Arouri
Born in 1966 in the town of Arura, near Ramallah in the West Bank, Saleh al-Arouri would grow to become one of the most strategically significant figures in Hamas. Unlike many of his counterparts who were based in Gaza or refugee camps, al-Arouri hailed from the occupied West Bank—an origin that helped position him as a key conduit between Hamas and other regional factions, including Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad.
A founding member of the al-Qassam Brigades, al-Arouri was known for helping to define Hamas’ military posture in the 1990s and early 2000s. He played a central role in the 2011 Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange, which saw over 1,000 Palestinians freed, including Sinwar, in return for one Israeli soldier—a move that further cemented his reputation as both a tactician and a negotiator.
However, on January 2, 2024, al-Arouri was assassinated in an Israeli drone strike in Beirut, Lebanon. The targeted killing led Hamas to suspend all ceasefire discussions, effectively ending the negotiation process, which, it had been reported just before the strike, was nearing an agreement.
Mahmoud al-Zahar
Born in 1945 in Gaza City, al-Zahar earned a medical degree in Egypt and later a master's in surgery from Ain Shams University.
He returned to Gaza and became one of the movement’s key ideologues and founding political leaders. Known for his uncompromising stance on resistance, al-Zahar remains a senior figure in Hamas’ political wing. He survived an Israeli airstrike in 2003 that killed his eldest son and bodyguard, further deepening his hardline posture.
Ghazi Hamad
Ghazi Hamad is a senior political leader and spokesperson for Hamas, known for his roles in both diplomacy and governance. Born in 1964 in Yebna refugee camp in Gaza, Hamad is a trained veterinarian who transitioned into journalism and politics.
He has served as the deputy foreign minister in the Hamas-run Gaza government and has been involved in several key negotiations and public communications on behalf of the movement.
Unlike more hardline figures, Hamad is often seen as a pragmatic voice within Hamas, advocating for political strategy alongside resistance. His public statements frequently emphasize the broader Palestinian struggle against occupation and frame resistance as a legal and moral right under international law.
Ibrahim al-Yazuri
Ibrahim al-Yazuri was born in 1941 in Beit Daras, but was forced out by Israeli gangs in 1948, eventually coming to be raised in a tent in Khan Younis. As an early member of the Muslim Brotherhood and co-founder of Hamas, al-Yazuri played a role in organizing the latter group's foundational outreach infrastructure and political doctrine.
His work focused heavily on mobilizing community support in Gaza’s most impoverished neighborhoods.
He was instrumental in the early establishment of Hamas-affiliated charities that provided social services while quietly advancing political loyalty to the movement.
Abdel Fattah Dukhan
An educator and political thinker, Dukhan was one of the chief architects of the original Hamas Charter in 1988. His influence on the ideological framing of the movement gave him a reputation as one of its intellectual foundations.
He is credited with drafting the document’s emphasis on Islamic nationalism and the rejection of any permanent peace with Israel.
Mohammed Deif
Mohammed Deif was born in 1965 in the Khan Yunis refugee camp to a family forcibly displaced from the village of al-Qubayba during the 1948 Nakba.
A founding figure in Hamas’s armed resistance, Deif joined the organization in 1987 and rose to lead its military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, by 2002.
He was widely regarded as the strategic architect behind Hamas’s tunnel networks and long-range rocket capabilities—tactics developed not for conquest, but for asymmetric survival under siege.
Over the years, Israel launched repeated assassination attempts against him, maiming him and killing members of his family. On July 13, 2024, after decades of pursuit, Deif was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Khan Yunis.
Hamas’ Political and Military Evolution
Hamas’ influence grew rapidly. In January 2006, Palestinians participated in what international observers deemed free and fair parliamentary elections.
Hamas ran on a platform that combined Islamic values with promises to end corruption and continue resistance to occupation. It won a decisive majority, capturing 74 of 132 parliamentary seats compared to Fatah’s 45.
The result gave Hamas control of the Palestinian Legislative Council—an outcome that further fractured Palestinian politics when Fatah refused to cede power.
This led to escalating tensions that culminated in the Battle of Gaza (2007), where Hamas forcibly expelled Fatah forces and solidified control over Gaza.
Much to the chagrin of the U.S., whose own leaders later lamented not rigging the elections to prevent Hamas from winning, the democratic process did not produce an outcome favorable to Western interests.
Hillary Clinton, in a 2006 interview, openly admitted that the U.S. should have “done something” to ensure a different result, stating,
“We should have made sure that we did something to determine who was going to win.”
This admission not only provides a glimpse into the U.S.’ disregard for democracy but also underscores how the imperialist entity views Palestinian self-governance—not as a right, but as a privilege contingent on electing leaders aligned with American and Israeli interests.
When Palestinians exercised their right to vote and chose a party that the U.S. disapproved of, the response was immediate economic and diplomatic strangulation, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
Since the party’s election in 2006, Israel, Egypt and the West have imposed suffocating blockades on Gaza, exacerbating humanitarian crises and collectively punishing over two million civilians for Hamas’ governance.
This humanitarian crisis has only deepened with the recent attacks on UNRWA facilities and the defunding of the agency, which itself is an institution that exists solely because of the ethnic cleansing carried out by Israel during and after its creation.
Civil Governance and Internal Structure
Hamas operates a government structure in Gaza that includes ministries, municipal councils, and civil service departments. Since it’s rise to political power 2007, the organization has maintained functioning institutions overseeing health, education, justice, interior security, and infrastructure—many of which operate with greater consistency than rival authorities under the Palestinian Authority.
At the helm of this apparatus is the Shura Council, who oversee Hamas’ highest decision-making body, its Political Bureau, or Politburo.
Rooted in the Qur’anic principle of shura (consultation), the Council is tasked with formulating strategic policy, electing leadership, and supervising the political and military wings. It comprises representatives from both inside Palestine and the diaspora, reflecting a balance between local needs and broader regional strategy.
Even under blockade, Hamas’ ministries—such as the Ministries of Health and of Education—continue to administer essential services to the extent that they are able.
Local governance bodies manage water, sanitation, and policing. This infrastructure has been greatly diminished under blockades against anything that may provide sustenance to the starving and sick population.
Cutting off these resources while also bombing its shelters amounts to collective punishment on a civilian population that has already been caged, starved, and kept stateless by the occupation. It is an escalation not just of war, but of cruelty.
The Myth of Electoral Guilt and the Weaponization of Democracy
Even if one insists on this compulsory condemnation of Hamas and, through some contorted logic, deems those who voted for them deserving of genocide as collective punishment, there are some facts worth considering:
The overwhelming majority of Gaza’s current population was either too young to vote in 2006 or had not yet been born.
This means that the primary victims of the blockade and military aggression are children and young people—many of whom had no say in the political decisions that are now being used to justify their suffering.
These blockades, coupled with military assaults and economic strangulation, have made governance itself an act of survival rather than a reflection of democratic stability.
Hamas as a Governing Authority
Moreover, repeated attempts to hold new elections have been stymied by ongoing divisions with the Palestinian Authority and external interference.
This indicates that Hamas' prolonged reign is, perhaps, not necessarily a product of unchecked authoritarianism—at least not solely. Instead, the lacking leadership change is a result of deliberate efforts to ensure that no viable alternative can emerge.
In the meantime, infighting between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas continues to serve Israeli interests. Israel has long worked to ensure this division—at times even propping up Hamas—because a fractured leadership creates chaos, preventing the formation of a unified front.
So long as resistance remains divided, normalization between factions remains stalled, and the dream of a consolidated liberation movement is deferred.
This fragmentation also ensures that resistance remains inseparable from religious framing. Israel benefits from this entanglement.
It allows them to dismiss Palestinian struggle as religious fanaticism, making it easier to conflate anti-Zionist sentiment with antisemitism.
Yet Western narratives conveniently ignore these facts, instead reducing Gaza’s political reality to the simplistic, hypocritical claim that “Hamas is a dictatorship” and a “terrorist” organization.
As mentioned, the organization has undergone a number of leadership changes, evolving over time in both structure and ideology.
These transitions indicate that, despite prolonged governance by Hamas, internal leadership and doctrines have shifted, reflecting a dynamic political structure rather than the ‘static dictatorship’ Western narratives heavily rely upon.
As for claims that Hamas is a singular dictatorship that has remained in power for 19 years, leadership turnover and ideological shifts challenge this portrayal.
By this logic, one would also have to characterize places like California, where Democratic leadership has remained unbroken for decades across multiple administrations, or Texas, where Republicans have held uninterrupted control of the governorship and state legislature since the 1990s, as dictatorships.
Whereas one might argue that these strangleholds were upheld through democratic elections, such a statement would be naive at best, given the sheer amount of gerrymandering, dark money interference and subversive, propagandizing messaging that abounds in every election cycle—effectively defeating any such argument.
This, of course, in a nation where term limits are largely non-existent and congressional and judicial appointments are often lifetime gigs.
If we are to judge today’s Palestinian leadership by its historical wrongs, then we must also interrogate the blood-stained legacies of America’s political institutions.
The Democratic Party fought to defend slavery and crafted Jim Crow. The Republican Party has spent decades exploiting racism through the Southern Strategy, backing death squads in Central America, obstructing civil rights enforcement, and launching the Gulf War on lies that cost hundreds of thousands of lives.
Both parties carry body counts that far exceed anything attributable to Hamas in its 38 years of existence—yet neither is ever subjected to the condemnation now routinely demanded of Palestinian resistance.
To follow this logic, every branch of U.S. government should be abolished for its complicity in genocide both nationally and internationally, which they’ve spread over like a disease since they established colony one.
Yet, time and again, patriotic Americans continue to vote to continue relinquishing their power, privacy and autonomy to the institution, somehow overlooking the sins of their own nation while pontificating from a laughable, imaginary moral high ground.
These same Americans will insist that, within their politics, the persistence of a ruling party does not inherently equate to authoritarian rule—a bold assertion, particularly in an environment where internal efforts and external forces alike actively hinder fair and free elections domestically.
Hamas, Israel, and the Western Narrative
While Hamas has been labeled a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. and its allies, the historical record shows that Israel itself has actively facilitated group’s rise—not as an oversight, but as a deliberate strategy to weaken Palestinian resistance by sowing division between factions.
This contradiction exposes a cynical realpolitik behind Israel’s policies, where Hamas is demonized as an existential threat while simultaneously allowed to exist—even indirectly supported when politically convenient.
Leaked documents and investigative reports have revealed that Israel permitted Qatari funds to reach Hamas-controlled Gaza. Meanwhile, Netanyahu himself has been caught admitting that keeping Hamas strong served Israeli interests, by sowing dissent and preventing the emergence of a unified Palestinian front.
In a post-October 7 pivot, Israel has shifted its support again, exploring ways to exploit segments of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. While the full extent of any formal agreement remains unclear, the PA security forces’ intensifying crackdowns on Palestinian dissent—including the shooting of civilians, arrests of journalists, and suppression of protests—suggest a renewed willingness to serve once more as the occupation’s internal enforcer.
The logic behind such tactics is as much about controlling the story as it’s about controlling the territory. Just as Israel manipulates internal Palestinian dynamics to fracture resistance, Western institutions shape the discourse to fracture solidarity.
The result is the same: discredit the opposition before it can organize.
Western media, adherent to propaganda tools like The Israel Project’s Global Language Dictionary, ensure that any form of Palestinian resistance—whether by Hamas or nonviolent activists like the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement—is framed as terrorism, and any criticism of this stance is immediately labeled antisemitism.
Meanwhile, Israeli war crimes, illegal settlements, and apartheid policies are systematically sanitized under the euphemism of “self-defense.”
The implications of these facts are glaringly apparent: Israel and the West do not support democracy, sovereignty, or stability in Palestine, but rather a perpetual state of fragmentation, subjugation, and controlled instability.
Hamas, despite being vilified, remains a convenient foil, allowing Israel to justify its relentless military campaigns in Gaza while ensuring that no viable, internationally recognized Palestinian state can emerge.
The Legal Right to Resist
Under international law, occupied peoples have the legal right to resist occupation, a fact that is habitually omitted in Western narratives about Palestinian resistance.
The right to resist foreign domination and colonial rule is not a vague or controversial concept—it is explicitly codified in multiple binding legal frameworks.
The Fourth Geneva Convention (1949)—the cornerstone of humanitarian law in armed conflict—protects civilians under military occupation and explicitly prohibits collective punishment, forced displacement, and violence against noncombatants.
Article 1 of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions recognizes that peoples under colonial domination and foreign occupation have the right to struggle for self-determination, including through armed resistance.
Additionally, UN General Assembly Resolution 37/43 (1982) affirms:
“The legitimacy of the struggle of peoples for independence, territorial integrity, national unity, and liberation from colonial and foreign domination by all available means, including armed struggle.”
This resolution directly recognizes the right of Palestinians to resist Israeli occupation—a right that Western governments refuse to acknowledge while simultaneously backing Israel’s military actions.
The Right to Return and Self-Determination
The Palestinian struggle is not only about resistance against occupation—it is also about the right to return and self-determination, both of which are enshrined in international law.
UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (1948) affirms the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes from which they were forcibly expelled.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) both recognize the right to self-determination as a fundamental human right.
Despite this, Israel continues to deny Palestinians their right to return, even as it facilitates the illegal settlement of Jewish Israelis on occupied Palestinian land—a direct violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of an occupier’s population into occupied territory.
Apartheid and Genocide: Israel’s Violations of International Law
The Israeli state’s policies toward Palestinians—including systematic displacement, segregation, and military aggression—meet the legal definitions of apartheid and genocide as recognized under international law.
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002) defines apartheid as a crime against humanity, characterized by:
“Inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime.”
Reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations all conclude that Israeli policies toward Palestinians constitute apartheid.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) defines genocide as:
“Acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”
Israel’s policies—including mass displacement, targeted killings, and the blockade-induced humanitarian crisis in Gaza—fit this definition.
Despite a clear, cohesive legal basis for Palestinian resistance, Hamas is labeled a terrorist organization, while Israel’s war crimes and genocidal violations of humanitarian and international law are justified as “self-defense.”
Self defense, they insist, against a stateless people with no standing army, no air force, no navy—no means of defense even remotely proportional to the violence inflicted on them by the Zionist state.
When one considers the time Hamas has existed in relation to how long Israel’s genocide against Palestinians has been ongoing, the former represents less than 48 percent of that period.
Were one to go back further, to the pre-state aggressions, commencing in 1917, Hamas has been around for 34 percent of the intervening time.
In the simplest terms: today’s conflict is not an outlier. It is only the latest chapter in a century-long struggle for self-determination.
Hundreds of thousands were dispossessed and massacred before Hamas ever existed—before the thought of resistance had even formed in the mind of a single displaced refugee.
Nevertheless, Western media continues to frame the issue as if history began on October 7, 2023—as if the entire conflict can be reduced to a binary struggle between Netanyahu and Hamas, forcing the rest of us to voice dissent within those pre-approved parameters.
All the while, this controlled opposition willfully excludes from the narrative decades of Israeli massacres, starvation, and ethnic cleansing that gave rise to Hamas in the first place.
This reframing distorts reality: that the broader struggle against Israeli settler-colonialism extends far beyond Hamas—it is a fight for the right to return to the homes from which their forbearers were violently removed generations ago; a fight for the right to determine for themselves their own destiny; a fight for their own survival.
A Resistance, Fighting for Survival
Demonized, mythologized, ostracized conceptually from the very notion of humanity, the ranks of the Hamas resistance are not made up of imported soldiers or foreign ideologues.
They are drawn from the population of Gaza itself—young men who have grown up under never-ending blockade, surveillance, bombardment, and apartheid.
Many are the children of martyrs, whose parents were killed in airstrikes or shot by occupation forces.
Others are survivors of demolished homes, drone missiles, or white phosphorus bombings, radicalized not by religion—at least not religion alone—but by firsthand experience with systemic violence and daily dehumanization.
Some fight because they watched their schools turned to rubble. Others fight because they held the severed limbs of their siblings in their hands, or were pulled from beneath collapsed buildings with the taste of suffocating concrete dust still in their mouths.
Their motivations are not always ideological, and they’re rarely abstract. Many join not out of zealotry, but because there are few alternatives—no safe future, no freedom of movement, no meaningful economy, and no justice for the crimes committed against their people with impunity.
Even before October 7, unemployment in Gaza was upwards of 40 percent, with 80 percent of the population dependent on foreign aid for survival (unemployment is now at a record 68 percent).
Nothing left but to fight the occupation; to fight against the sole impediment to their collective liberation.
Combine this with a reality where merely existing as an indigenous Palestinian is treated as provocation enough to justify annihilation, and resistance becomes a language of survival.
Given the choice to face that reality alone—or to stand alongside neighbors, family, and friends—most do not choose solitude. Nor would it be reasonable to expect them to.
Just as one would be deemed ridiculous do demand another to condemn the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, or to denounce Nat Turner’s Rebellion, or to rebuke the Pueblo Revolt, similar ridicule should be reserved for those who insist on condemnation of Hamas without any sense of irony, nuance or semblance of critical thinking.
Never mind the fact that the reactionary nature of the demand is drenched in ignorant, nationalistic dogma, formed by years of media messaging and state-enforced authoritarianism.
The proselytized American masses who utter this inane thought-terminating cliché have no sense of self-awareness, pontificating from the comfort of one of the most terroristic nations in modern history—the only nation to drop not one, but two, nuclear bombs onto innocent civilian populations.
It’s the same nation that sterilized Puerto Rican women without their knowledge or consent.
It’s the same one that staged coups in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile. It also bears complicity in genocides in Cambodia, Bangladesh, East Timor, Rwandan, Yemen—each with devastating consequences for the local populations.
This is the same nation that murders its own citizens in their sleep for daring to fight against injustice; the same that bombs its own people, kids included, in acts of domestic terrorism.
The same that has presented false premises for war, without any consideration for the young people they sacrifice to the war machine. The very same one that empowered Saddam and Ghadaffi before slapping the “terrorist” label on them, too.
Ironically, this “nation,” itself, was established in a way not dissimilar to that of Israel: through broken promises, ethnic cleansing and brutal campaigns of terror.
Yet those who have descended from these blood thirsty genocidaires have the audacity to call this “our” land—as if the decision to coexist was mutual.
It’s an unimaginably inflated sense of privilege, indeed, to think that any American is in a position to dictate the appropriate means of resistance against a genocide it is actively empowering.
It is the uppermost height of Western arrogance to demand the privilege of telling a decimated, impoverished nation of people how they’re allowed to resist their oppressors, especially while waving the flag of a nation that enables these conditions.
From the Arab Revolt in 1936–1939 to Hamas as it exists as a political and military entity today, acts of resistance have not been isolated or spontaneous outbursts of irrational hostility as Western media would have you, the unwitting consumer, believe.
Rather, this aggression is the inevitable response to a system imposed from above. When Britain carved up a land it didn’t own, and gifted it to a movement it endorsed, it denied the native population any political recourse.
These are acts of resistance born of survival—a desperate defense against the never-ending subjugation and displacement they endure.
The only real difference between then and now is the sheer magnitude of propaganda, or “hasbara,” that has amassed, shielding Israel from accountability. For decades, a carefully orchestrated disinformation campaign—targeting the American public—has shaped perception, obscured truth, and sanitized atrocity.
It didn’t occur by happenstance. It’s been made possible by billions funneled into lobbying and political influence, securing the loyalty of U.S. officials who operate less like public servants and more like foreign agents, legislating in defense of a state that is not their own.
Today, the weapons may have changed. The battlefield may be more brutal. Yet, the principle remains the same: an occupied people will always fight against their own erasure.
Just like Malcolm X said, liberation will be achieved “by any means necessary.”